http://www.uc.pt/++preview++/fluc/lif/workshop2dedezembro
terça-feira, 29 de novembro de 2011
segunda-feira, 14 de novembro de 2011
ANTIGA: Leituras obrigatórias: in-evitáveis.
Filosofia Antiga.
Leituras obrigatórias:
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
Livro II, Alfa minúsculo.
Livro VII, Zeta.
Aristotle, Physics, Provided by The Internet Classics Archive.
See bottom for copyright. Available online at
Livros: IV (Delta), V (Épsilon) e VI (Zeta).
domingo, 13 de novembro de 2011
W, L., Philosophische Untersuchungen/PDF.
http://www.emlange.de/inhalt/ueberWittgenstein/pdf/PUKGANZ.pdf
PhD. November the 19th. Apparatus: Wittgenstein.
19/11: Definitory Indication. Description, words employed. Exactness.
WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Anwendung von Wörtern: 69, 182, Beschreibung, 354, 665, Exaktheit: 69-70, 75, 77, hinweisende Definition: 6, 27-34, 38, 45, 49, 258, 362, 380, 429, 444.
K. Kalbfleisch, Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8. Berlin: Reimer, 1907]: 1-438.
In Aristotelis categorias commentarium {4013.003 Click to search or save}
Phil., Comm.
K. Kalbfleisch, Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8. Berlin: Reimer, 1907]: 1-438.
Word Count: 171,042
M. Wallies, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1891]: 1-591.
In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria {0732.006 Click to search or save}
Phil., Comm.
M. Wallies, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1891]: 1-591.
Word Count: 188,697
L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949 (repr. 1966): 3-45 (1a1-15b32).
Categoriae {0086.006 Click to search or save}
Phil.
L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949 (repr. 1966): 3-45 (1a1-15b32).
Word Count: 10,537
W.D. Ross, Aristotelis topica et sophistici elenchi. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958 (repr. 1970 (1st edn. corr.)): 1-189 (100a18-164b19).
Topica {0086.044 Click to search or save}
Phil.
W.D. Ross, Aristotelis topica et sophistici elenchi. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958 (repr. 1970 (1st edn. corr.)): 1-189 (100a18-164b19).
Word Count: 45,655
sexta-feira, 11 de novembro de 2011
PhD: Bibliografia para amanhã. Não consegui acabar mais cedo.
Topica {0086.044 Click to search or save}
Phil.
W.D. Ross, Aristotelis topica et sophistici elenchi. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958 (repr. 1970 (1st edn. corr.)): 1-189 (100a18-164b19).
Word Count: 45,655
Categoriae {0086.006 Click to search or save}
Phil.
L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949 (repr. 1966): 3-45 (1a1-15b32).
Word Count: 10,537
In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria {0732.006 Click to search or save}
Phil., Comm.
M. Wallies, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1891]: 1-591.
Word Count: 188,697
In Aristotelis categorias commentarium {4013.003 Click to search or save}
Phil., Comm.
K. Kalbfleisch, Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8. Berlin: Reimer, 1907]: 1-438.
Word Count: 171,042
PhD. Aparato para a sessão de 11 de Novembro.
(100a.) ΤΟΠΙΚΩΝ Α (t)
Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν ἀφ’ ἧς (18)
δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι
περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος
προ-
βλήματος
ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες
μηθὲν (20)
ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον. πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ
τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, ὅπως ληφθῇ
ὁ διαλεκτικὸς συλλογι-
σμός· τοῦτον γὰρ ζητοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην πραγμα-
τείαν.
Πρῶτον οὖν θεωρητέον ἐκ τίνων ἡ μέθοδος. εἰ δὴ λάβοι-
μεν πρὸς πόσα καὶ ποῖα καὶ ἐκ τίνων οἱ λόγοι, καὶ πῶς
τούτων εὐπορήσομεν, ἔχοιμεν ἂν ἱκανῶς τὸ προκείμενον. ἔστι
δ’ ἀριθμῷ ἴσα καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐξ ὧν τε οἱ λόγοι καὶ περὶ ὧν
οἱ συλλογισμοί. γίνονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προ- (15)
τάσεων· περὶ ὧν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματά
ἐστι. @1
πᾶσα δὲ πρότασις καὶ πᾶν πρόβλημα ἢ ἴδιον ἢ γένος ἢ
συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὴν διαφορὰν ὡς οὖσαν γενικὴν
ὁμοῦ τῷ γένει τακτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι
σημαίνει, τὸ δ’ οὐ σημαίνει, διῃρήσθω τὸ ἴδιον εἰς ἄμφω (20)
τὰ προειρημένα μέρη, καὶ καλείσθω τὸ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι
σημαῖνον ὅρος, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν περὶ αὐτῶν
ἀποδοθεῖσαν
ὀνομασίαν προσαγορευέσθω ἴδιον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι κατὰ τὴν νῦν διαίρεσιν τέτταρα τὰ πάντα
συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, ἢ ὅρον ἢ ἴδιον ἢ γένος ἢ συμβεβηκός. (25)
Λεκτέον δὲ τί ὅρος, τί ἴδιον, τί γένος, τί συμβεβηκός.
ἔστι δ’ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, ἀποδίδο-
(102a.) ται
δὲ ἢ λόγος ἀντ’ ὀνόματος ἢ λόγος ἀντὶ λόγου·
ὅσοι
δ’ ὁπωσοῦν ὀνόματι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
ἀποδιδόασιν οὗτοι τὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶς @1
ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν.
ὁρικὸν μέντοι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θετέον, (5)
οἷον ὅτι <τὸ> καλόν ἐστι τὸ πρέπον.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πότερον
ταὐτὸν αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἕτερον·
καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοὺς
ὁρισμοὺς πότερον ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον ἡ πλείστη γίνεται δια-
τριβή
.
ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁρικὰ πάντα λεγέσθω τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν
ὄντα μέθοδον τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα (10)
τοιαῦτ’ ἐστί, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν. δυνάμενοι γὰρ ὅτι ταὐτὸν
καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον διαλέγεσθαι, τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
ὁρισμοὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν εὐπορήσομεν· δείξαντες γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν
ἐστιν ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸν ὁρισμόν. οὐ μὴν ἀντιστρέφει γε
τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι τὸν ὁρι- (15)
σμὸν τὸ δεῖξαι ταὐτὸν ὄν. πρὸς μέντοι τὸ ἀνασκευάσαι αὔτ-
αρκες τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν.
Ἴδιον δ’ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ’
ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος.
οἷον ἴδιον:
ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν·
εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, γραμματικῆς δεκτικός ἐστι,
καὶ εἰ γραμματικῆς δεκτικός ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἴδιον λέγει τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν,
οἷον τὸ καθεύδειν ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐδ’ ἂν τύχῃ κατά τινα χρόνον μόνῳ ὑπάρχον.
εἰ δ’ ἄρα τι καὶ λέγοιτο τῶν τοιούτων ἴδιον, 1) οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ, 2) ποτὲ ἢ 3) πρός τι ἴδιον ῥηθήσεται·
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δεξιῶν εἶναι ποτὲ ἴδιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δίπουν πρός τι ἴδιον τυγχάνει λεγόμενον, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ἵππον καὶ κύνα. ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν οὐθὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι καθεύδει, ἄνθρωπον εἶναι. (30)
Γένος δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ
εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον.
ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα λεγέσθω ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἀποδοῦναι ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐστι τὸ προκείμενον·
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἁρμόττει, ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐστιν, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζῷον.
γενικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ πότερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει τῷ γένει.
διαλεχθέντες γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ βοός, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (102b.) γένει· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρου δείξωμεν ὅτι γένος ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ταῦτ’ ἐστίν.
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστί, μήτε ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι, (5) καὶ
ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῳοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν·
οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ οὐθὲν κωλύει ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι.
ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὁρισμῶν ὁ δεύτερος βελτίων· (10)
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρώτου ῥηθέντος ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει τις συνήσειν, προειδέναι τί ἐστιν ὅρος καὶ ἴδιον καὶ γένος· ὁ δὲ δεύτερος αὐτοτελής ἐστι πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ λεγόμενον καθ’ αὑτό.
προσκείθωσαν δὲ τῷ συμβεβηκότι καὶ αἱ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσεις
ὁπωσοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος λεγόμεναι,
οἷον πότερον τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ συμφέρον αἱρετώτερον,
καὶ πότερον ὁ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁ κατ’ ἀπόλαυσιν ἡδίων βίος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο παραπλησίως τυγχάνει τούτοις λεγόμενον·
ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ κατηγορούμενον συμβέβηκεν ἡ ζήτησις γίνεται. δῆλον δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει ποτὲ καὶ πρός τι ἴδιον γίνεσθαι·
οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ὄν, ὅταν τις μόνος καθῆται, τότε ἴδιον ἔσται, μὴ μόνου δὲ καθημένου πρὸς τοὺς μὴ καθημένους ἴδιον. ὥστε καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποτὲ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδιον γίνεσθαι. ἁπλῶς δ’ ἴδιον οὐκ ἔσται.
.
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Πρῶτον δὲ πάντων περὶ ταὐτοῦ διοριστέον ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
δόξειε δ’ ἂν τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν τριχῇ διαιρεῖσθαι.
ἢ γὰρ 1) ἀριθμῷ ἢ 2) εἴδει ἢ 3) γένει τὸ ταὐτὸν εἰώθαμεν προσαγορεύειν·
- ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ὀνόματα πλείω τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἕν,
οἷον λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον·
2) εἴδει δὲ ὅσα πλείω ὄντα ἀδιάφορα κατὰ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι,
καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῷ εἴδει λέγεται ταὐτὰ
ὅσα ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ εἶδός ἐστιν·
- ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γένει ταὐτὰ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος ἐστίν,
οἷον ἵππος ἀνθρώπῳ.
δόξειε δ’ ἂν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κρήνης ὕδωρ ταὐτὸν λεγόμενον ἔχειν τινὰ (15) διαφορὰν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τετάχθω τοῖς καθ’ ἓν εἶδος ὁπωσοῦν λεγομένοις· ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα συγγενῆ καὶ παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἔοικεν εἶναι.
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μάλιστα δ’ ὁμολογουμένως τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὸν παρὰ πᾶσι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
εἴωθε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδίδοσθαι πλεοναχῶς·
κυριώτατα μὲν καὶ πρώτως ὅταν ὀνόματι ἢ ὅρῳ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἀποδοθῇ, καθάπερ ἱμάτιον λωπίῳ καὶ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ἀνθρώπῳ·
δεύτερον δ’ ὅταν τῷ ἰδίῳ, καθάπερ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἄνω φερόμενον πυρί·
τρίτον δ’ ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον τὸ καθήμενον ἢ τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει·
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ βούλεται σημαίνειν. ὅτι δ’ ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν ἐστιν, ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων τὰς προσηγορίας μάλιστ’ ἄν τις καταμάθοι·
πολλάκις γάρ, ἐπιτάσσοντες ὀνόματι καλέσαι τινὰ τῶν καθημένων, μεταβάλλομεν ὅταν τύχῃ μὴ συνιεὶς ᾧ τὴν πρόσταξιν ποιούμεθα, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον συνήσοντος, καὶ κελεύομεν τὸν καθήμενον ἢ διαλεγόμενον καλέσαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, δῆλον ὡς ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες κατά τε τοὔνομα καὶ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς σημαίνειν.
(103b.) Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τριχῇ διῃρήσθω.
ὅτι δ’ ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων οἱ λόγοι καὶ διὰ τούτων καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα, μία μὲν πίστις ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς·
Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπισκοποίη ἑκάστην τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προβλημάτων, φαίνοιτ’ ἂν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἢ ἀπὸ (5) τοῦ γένους ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος γεγενημένη.
ἄλλη δὲ πίστις ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶν τὶ περί τινος κατηγορούμενον ἤτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι
τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μή.
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη (εἰ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὅρος, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴδιον·
τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἴδιον, τὸ ἀντικατηγορούμενον μὲν μὴ σημαῖνον δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος, ἤτοι τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ.
καὶ εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων, γένος ἢ διαφορὰ ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστιν·
εἰ δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων ἐστί, δῆλον ὅτι συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐλέγετο ὃ μήτε ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος ἐστίν, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι.
Μετὰ τοίνυν ταῦτα δεῖ διορίσασθαι τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχουσιν αἱ ῥηθεῖσαι τέτταρες. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὸν ἀριθμὸν δέκα, τί ἐστι, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι, ποῦ, ποτέ, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν.
ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν μιᾷ τούτων τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἔσται·
πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ διὰ τούτων προτάσεις ἢ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ
κατηγοριῶν σημαίνουσιν. δῆλον δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνων ὁτὲ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ὁτὲ δὲ ποσόν, ὁτὲ δὲ ποιόν, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κατηγοριῶν.
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκειμένου ἀνθρώπου
φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ ζῷον, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ οὐσίαν σημαίνει·
ὅταν δὲ χρώματος λευκοῦ ἐκκειμένου
φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον λευκὸν εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποιὸν σημαίνει.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν πηχυαίου μεγέθους ἐκκειμένου
φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον πηχυαῖον εἶναι μέγεθος, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποσὸν σημαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων·
ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐάν τε αὐτὸ περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγηται ἐάν τε τὸ γένος περὶ τούτου, τί ἐστι σημαίνει·
ὅταν δὲ περὶ ἑτέρου, οὐ τί ἐστι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν. ὥστε περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὧν, (104a.) ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι· πῶς δὲ ληψόμεθα καὶ δι’ ὧν εὐπορήσομεν, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.
Aristoteles et Corpus Aristotelicum Phil., Categoriae. {0086.006}
(1b.) λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑπο-
κειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται
τῆς γραμματικῆς· τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ’
ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵπ-
πος, —οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν (5)
οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·— ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν
ἀριθμῷ κατ’ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ
ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑπο-
κειμένῳ ἐστίν.
1 συλλογ-ίζομαι, Med., aor. -ελογισάμην Pl.R.618d, al.; rarely -ελογίσθην ib.531d: pf. -λελόγισμαι(v. infr.):—compute, reckon up, τὰ ἐξ Ἑλλήνων τείχεα Hdt.2.148; ἕτερα σ. πρὸς τὸ κεφάλαιονLys.32.22; τὰς ἑορτὰς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτόν Pl.Lg.799a; ταῦτα πάντα σ. Id.Chrm.160d; τὰ κατηγορημένα ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς σ. recapitulate, D.19.177; τοὺς καιρούς, τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ib.47; ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων σ. καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον Arist.Metaph.1042a3; μανθάνειν καὶ σ. τί ἕκαστον Id.Po.1448b16; τὰς χρείας Plb.1.44.1; τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τολμήματος Plu.Pomp. 60; σ. ὅτι . . Pl.Lg.670c.
II. conclude from premisses, infer, τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου Id.Grg.479c, al.; σ. τί συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ib.498e; σ. περί τινος, ὅτι . . Id.R.516b; σ. περὶ [τῆς μήτρας], ὡς . . διαστελλομένης Gal.15.694; σ. ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις . . Pl. R.365a; σ. ὀρθῶς τίνος εἵνεκα ἔπραττεD.18.172; τἀφανὲς διὰ τοῦ φαινομένου Epicur.Nat.14.4, cf. Phld.Rh.2.40S.: c. acc. et inf., -σάμενος τὸ ἄλειμμα οὐκ ἄξιον ἔσεσθαι Inscr.Prien.112.57 (i B.C.); τὴν νόσον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἥξεινSor.Vit.Hippocr.7; τὸ . . αἷμα μὴ σεσῆφθαι Gal. 18(2).108.
2. in the Logic of Aristotle, infer by way of syllogism, infer syllogistically, σ. τὸ A κατὰ τοῦ B, A of B, APr.40b30; τὸ . . ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ σ. ib.68b16; τινὰ ἔκ τινων Rh.1357a8; σ. ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α τῷ BAPo.79b30: pf. in pass. sense, οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐ συλλελόγισται is not syllogistic, APr.42a39;συλλελογισμένα syllogistically concluded, opp. ἀσυλλόγιστα, Rh.1357a8.
3. συλλελογισμένον ἦν αὐτῷ μὴ πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν ἕως . . he had planned not to . . ,Plb.14.4.4.
2 4. propose, bring forward a thing to be examined and debated, also give an opportunity fordebate, voting, ἐς μέσον σφι π. πρῆγμα Hdt.1.206; π. τὸν λόγον Id.8.59; γνώμας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς Th.1.139; π. λόγον (sc. εἰς ἐκκλησίαν) Aeschin.2.65; λόγον περί τινος X.Mem.4.2.3; γνώμας π. αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις, of the Prytanes, Th.6.14, cf. 3.36; π. τὴν διαγνώμην αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων ib.42, cf.Isoc.8.15; π. βουλὴν εἴτε . . εἴτε . . D.H.6.15; τὸν ἐπιμήνιον, ἢν μὴ προθῇ, ἑκατὸν στατῆρας ὀφείλεινSIG58.10 (Milet., v B.C.), cf. 141.12 (Corc. Nigra, iv B.C.), 167.13 (Mylasa, iv B.C.), al.; προθεῖναι αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν propose a discussion about . ., Th.3.38; τὸ συμφέρον ἡ πόλις προὐτίθει σκοπεῖν D.18.273, etc.; π. αὐτοῖς κρίσιν appoint a trial for them, Lys.27.8; π. αὐτοῖς ἀγορὰν δικῶν Luc.Bis Acc.4; προέθηκε . . λέγειν τὰ ἑκατέροισι . . κατέργασται has proposed (orinitiated) a recital of what each has done, Hdt.9.27: c. dat. pers. et inf., Id.3.38: c. acc. et inf., π. γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον Id.8.49:—Med., ἤν τις προθῆται ψῆφον, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὸν νόμον τοῦτον SIG45.33 (Halic., v B.C.):—Pass., οὐ προὐτέθη σφίσι λόγος speech was not allowedthem, X.HG1.7.5; ψῆφος περὶ ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ προτεθεῖσα D.19.65.
3 3. in the Logic of Arist., question as to whether a statement is so or not, Arist. Top.101b28, cf.104b1: τὰ π. title of work by Arist., cf. Mete.363a24, PA676a18, GA747b5, cf. προβληματικός; also of the extant work wrongly ascribed to Arist.
4 4. sustain, maintain, λόγον an argument, Arist.Rh.1354a5, Metaph.1011a22, al.; ὑπόθεσινId.Top.158a31; θέσιν καὶ ὁρισμόν ib.160b14. (For the Med., v. ὑπισχνέομαι.)
5 d. in Logic, assume, take for granted, ἅπαν ζῷον λαμβάνει ἢ θνητὸν ἢ ἀθάνατον Arist.APr.46b6; λ. τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς ib.53a2, etc.:—Pass., τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ληφθέντα ib.26b30; αἱ εἰλημμέναι προτάσεις ib.33a15, cf. Phld.Rh.2.46 S.,Sign.35, Oec.p.5 J., S.E.P.2.89.
6 3. in the Logic of Arist., question as to whether a statement is so or not,Arist. Top.101b28, cf. 104b1: τὰ π. title of work by Arist., cf. Mete.363a24,PA676a18, GA747b5, cf. προβληματικός; also of the extant work wrongly ascribed to Arist.
7 4. concede, allow, c. inf., suffer or allow a person to do, ἀ. τισὶ αὐτονομεῖσθαι Th.1.144, cf. 3.36; εἰ δὲ τοῖς μὲν . . ἐπιτάττειν ἀποδώσετε D.2.30;ἀ. κολάζειν Id.23.56; τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἀποδίδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζεινLys.1.30; ἀ. τινὶ ζητεῖν Arist.Pol.1341b30, cf. Po.1454b5; also οὔτε ἀπολογίας ἀποδοθείσης And.4.3; ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγος ἀποδοθῇ when right of speech isallowed them, Aeschin.3.54.
5. ἀ. τινά with an Adj., render or make so and so, like ἀποδείκνυμι, ἀ. τὴν τέρψιν βεβαιοτέραν Isoc.1.46; τέλειον ἀ. τὸ τέκνον Arist.GA733b1; δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀ. Id.EN 1103b22; μετριωτέραν τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν D.H.7.16.
b. exhibit, display, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀρετήν And.1.109; ἀ. τὴν ἰδίαν μορφήν render, express it, Arist.Po.1454b10; ἀ. φαντασίαν τινός presentappearance of, Phld.Ir.p.71 W., al.
11. give an account or definition of a thing, explain it, E.Or.150; ἀ. τί ἐστί τιArist.Cat.2b8, cf. 1a10, Metaph.1040b30, al.; ἑπομένως τούτοις ἀ. τὴν ψυχήνId.de.An.405a4, cf. Ph.194b34, al.; also, use by way of definition, ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος Id.de An.403b1; simply, define, τὸν ἄνθρωπονS.E.M.7.272; expound, Phld.D.3.14, cf. Epicur.Nat.14.3, 119G., 143 G.; render, interpret one word by another, ἀ. τὴν κοτύλην ἄλεισον Ath.11.479c; explain, interpret, τὸ “φωνὴν αἵματος βοᾶν“ Ph.1.209:—Pass., βέλτιον ἀποδοθήσεταιEpicur.Ep.1 p.15 U.; ἀκριβεστέρως ἀποδοθήσεται A.D.Synt.45.21; ἀ. τι πρός τιuse with reference to, Olymp.in Mete.281.10, cf. Sch.Ar.Pl.538.
12. attach or append, make dependent upon, τί τινι or εἴς τι Hero Aut.24.5,6, 2.
13. ἀ. τί τινος assign a property to a thing, Arist.Top.128b28.
8 “Ἀποδίδοται” = “é dado”.
9 δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ λόγου (A. da P.) τινὰ (Suj.) σημαινομένων ὁρίσασθαι
10 Cf. De interpretatione.
11 “A maior parte do tempo é passada a…”
12 II. comparison, Philem.109, Lyr.Alex.Adesp.32; πρὸς ἄλληλα Arist. Top.102b15;τῶν ἀψύχων τοῖς ἀψύχοις Plb.6.47.10; οὐκ ἔχων σ. πρός τι admitting of nocomparison with . ., i.e. beyond all comparison better, Demetr.Sceps. ap.Ath.14.658b; συγκρίσεις τῆς ῥητορικῆς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ Phld.Rh.2.146S.; συγκρίσει by comparison, Babr.101.8; κατὰ σύγκρισιν Phryn.PS p.1 B., Suid. s.v.συγκριτικῶς; πρὸς σύγκρισιν IG5(2).268.53 (Mantinea, i B.C.), OGI669.56(Egypt, i A.D.); freq. in late Prose, as Plu.Flam.21, al., Luc.Asin.56.
13 II. Pass., in Logic, to be convertible, ἀ. τοῦ πράγματος Arist.Top.102a19, al.;reciprocate, of cause and effect, Id.APo.73a16, cf. 78a28.
quinta-feira, 10 de novembro de 2011
PhD. Protokol November the 5th. 1rst Part.
November the 5th.
Minutes.
ON Topics I.
(I use the english translation of the Loeb edition)
The main subject the Topica deals with is syllogistic reasoning, i.e. its main features and constituting elements. He (Aristotle?) starts immediately by drawing a distinction between dialectical and contentious reasoning (ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός). Συλλογισμός and συλλογίζεσθαι are compound words formed through assimilation: συν- and -λογισμός and συν- and λογίζεσθαι. They mean reasoning. A reasoning can be identified when it finishes. When someone says something we do not quite fully understand we might ask how he came to that conclusion. He could have jumped or rushed into it. He could also have thought about it thoroughly.
A reasoning is a way of applying certain rules to combine more elemental structures. These elemental structures are phrases or declarative sentences which are either affirmative or negative, existential or universally formulated.
Take for instance A and B in the “modus ponens” (A implies B. A. Therefore, B) and in the “modus tollens” (A implies B. Not B. Therefore not A) and take A, B and C in the hypothetical syllogism (If A, then B. If B, then C. Therefore, if A then C). A, B and C can be premises. B and C can be conclusions. B can be both a premise and a conclusion.
A, B and C isolated are however the elemental structures, each of which may be represented through a phrase or a declarative sentence. If A, B and C are sentences of the type “S is P”, “S is not P”, “Some S’s are P”, “Some S’s are not P”, “Every single S is P” or “There is no S that is P”, we need to know how they arrive at? their meaning, their reasoning basis, and whether they are true sentences or false ones.
Before we can move on to investigating how we formally deduce a true conclusion from some premises, the proper function of the συλλογισμός and συλλογίζεσθαι, we need to isolate the λόγος structure as its elementary and basic feature. The ΣΥΝ does not apply if we do not arrive first at a sentence, the elementary logical meaning structure.
Aristotle begins his investigation about what our opinions of (or thoughts about) things are grounded upon.
Text 1:
So “[in order to grasp dialectical reasoning] we need to find a method of investigation (μέθοδον) whereby we shall be able to reason from
opinions that are generally accepted (ἐξ ἐνδόξων) about every problem propounded to us (περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος). When we hold to a λόγος, there is nothing we can say that will contradict it (μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.)” Top. 100a18-242
Our concern is with the logical elementary structure, the λόγος. So we skip to A. IV.
Text 2. “First, then, we must see the parts of which our inquiry consists. Now if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many, and what kind of, things οἱ λόγοι take place, and with what materials they start, and (h) how we can become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently won our goal. Now the materials with which οἱ λόγοι start are equal in number, and are identical, with the subjects on which reasonings, συλλογισμοί, take place. For arguments start with 'propositions' (γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων) while the subjects on which reasonings take place are 'problems' (περὶ ὧν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματά ἐστι.). Now every proposition and every problem let us know (πᾶσα δὲ πρότασις καὶ πᾶν πρόβλημα δηλοῖ) either a peculiarity (ἴδιον) or genus (γένος) or an accident (συμβεβηκός).” Top. 101b11-19.
Text 3.
“The specific generic difference (διαφορά γενική) should be ranked (τακτέον) together with the genus (ὁμοῦ τῷ γένει).” Top. 101b18-19.
Aristotle is now ready to state the elementary formal features that constitute a λόγος. These are: “definition, ὅρος, peculiarities?, ἴδιον, genus, γένος, and incident (accident?), συμβεβηκός.” Before getting into a detailed analysis, let us briefly sketch the path Aristotle takes. His aim is to define what syllogistic reasoning is. He presents several ways of how reasoning takes place. He then zooms in on λόγος as the elemental structure of meaning. A λόγος may be a πρότασις, a sentence, S is p, which can be modified to a problem: whether S is p or not or whether it is or is not the case that S is p. It can also be the conclusion of a reasoning, a combination of several προτάσεις.
The terminus technicus λόγος is a sentence of the type: S is p. The question is how soundly S is thereby defined. The issue is not only to determine what are the grounds for us understanding that this is the case. A) It is the opinion of the majority. B) It is the opinion expressed by the experts. C) it is an axiom. D it is the result of a demonstration. What we are trying to determine is the kind of statement that catches the essence of something. Catching the “what it means to be the sort of thing this thing is”
To define something is to say what is particularly idiosyncratic about it. Now this something may for sure have some idiosyncratic characteristics which do not necessarily define it. They serve to momentarily help us identify this something or someone out of many others things that are very similar. We will go into this later. For the time being let us say that this is a property something or someone has at a particular time and in relation to others. This property is circumstantial, depending upon either time or a given relationship or connexion with others. So when I want to get someone’s attention, I tell another person to call me that guy over there, sitting on the right side of someone else, etc., etc. I do not even refer to my friend by his name, let alone saying who he is for me, a friend, an acquaintance or whatever.
On the other hand “what is peculiar, ἴδιον, to something means or signifies what it takes to be the thing that it is. What characterizes something in its peculiarity, what the thing has of its own, its ownness, is a definition: ὅρος. So “An animal that walks on two feet” is the definition, ὁρισμός, of “man”. “A man’s being a walking man on two feet” is what it takes for an animal to be a man, or for something to be someone.
Text 4
“A 'definition', ὅρος, is a phrase, λόγος, signifying, σημαίνων, a thing's essence, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It is rendered (ἀποδίδοται) in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term, or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well.” Top. 101b37-102a1.
Text 6
“It is sometimes possible to define what conveys meaning by a phrase as well (τῶν ὑπὸ λόγου τινὰ σημαινομένων ὁρίσασθαι). Those whο give an explanation (τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται) with only a designation (ὀνόματι) clearly do not render a definition of the thing in question ([ὁ] τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμός), because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind (πᾶς ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν.).”
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